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ABSTRACT 
A long-held view in the academy is that shareholders are 
“residual claimants” in the sense that shareholders are paid in full only 
after the corporation pays its creditors. The reality on the ground is far 
different. Corporations give assets away to their shareholders long before 
they have satisfied creditors, both voluntary contract creditors and 
involuntary tort creditors. In particular, existing U.S. corporate and 
voidable transfer laws allow corporations to pay dividends and make 
share repurchases up to the point where the corporation is insolvent or 
nearly so. Voluntary creditors can limit dividends and share repurchases 
by contract, but involuntary creditors like tort claimants cannot, and 
unsophisticated voluntary creditors rarely do so.  I use a simple Black-
Scholes model of a debtor firm to illustrate the incentive that shareholders 
have to take dividends and share repurchases before debts are repaid. I 
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then present data on the huge payouts of asset value by indebted U.S. 
publicly-traded corporations from 2010 to 2018. While good for 
shareholders, the permissiveness of corporate payout rules brings with it 
substantial social costs. Dividends and repurchases (1) dramatically 
increase the riskiness of corporate debt, diverting large resources into 
credit monitoring and speculation, (2) require a larger bankruptcy system 
to process large and complex corporate failures, (3) make firms more 
fragile and less resilient to financial crises, (4) unfairly shift costs to 
involuntary and unsophisticated creditors in violation of the implicit 
social bargain of limited liability, and (5) distort the supply of securities 
toward riskier debt that is publicly subsidized through tax deductibility of 
interest expense, simultaneously reducing the availability of safe assets 
that are in high demand. It would be socially beneficial to restrict 
dividends and share repurchases to corporations that have low debt and 
adequate insurance against harm to involuntary creditors, and that meet 
higher thresholds for wages and benefits. Such a rule would still allow 
corporations to operate without doing those things; they could still have 
high debt, be underinsured, and pay minimum wages with minimal 
benefits. But if they did so, they could not pay out assets to shareholders 
until they first met all their other obligations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A long-held view in the academy is that shareholders are “residual 
claimants” in the sense that shareholders are paid in full only after the 
corporation pays its creditors. As Professors Easterbrook and Fischel put 
it nearly thirty years ago: 
 
“[E]quity investors have the residual claim. They stand to 
gain or lose almost the whole value of modest fluctuations 
in the fortunes of the firm. The residual claimants 
therefore have incentives to invest in the amount of 
monitoring likely to produce these gains (or avoid the 
losses), net of the costs of monitoring. Debt claimants, 
protected by the ‘equity cushion,’ are more likely to be 
ignorant.”1 
 
The influential Delaware Court of Chancery, often influenced by 
corporate legal scholarship, has taken the term on for itself as well, stating 
that “[i]n a solvent corporation, the residual claimants are the 
stockholders”2 and setting out its most basic rules in such terms: 
“[d]irectors of a Delaware corporation owe fiduciary duties to the 
corporation and its stockholders which require that they strive prudently 
and in good faith to maximize the value of the corporation for the benefit 
of its residual claimants.”3 
The reality on the ground is very different. Shareholders routinely 
get paid before creditors. In particular, corporations give significant assets 
to their shareholders in the form of dividends and share repurchases long 
before they have satisfied both their voluntary contract and involuntary 
tort creditors.4 Existing law is quite permissive in allowing indebted 
                                                   
* J.B. Heaton, P.C., jb@jbheaton.com. 
1 Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the 
Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 91 (1985). See also John C. Coffee, Jr., 
Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L. 
REV. 1, 66 (1986) (“As the residual claimant, the shareholders receive all the 
upside return, but, because they have limited liability, they can avoid downside 
loss, except to the extent their capital is invested in the firm.”). 
2 Quadrant Structured Prods. Co. v. Vertin, 102 A.3d 155, 172 (Del. Ch. 
2014). 
3 In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 20 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
4 Financial economists recognize that interest payments and dividends or 
share repurchases are substitute methods for reducing free cash flow. See, e.g., 
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corporations to distribute this cash to shareholders. As a result, 
shareholders are hardly the “last paid” capital providers of corporate law 
folklore but rather, first-in, first-out, and then some capital providers who 
receive their capital back and much more while the corporation has 
outstanding liabilities, often very large in amount. From the shareholders' 
perspective, this behavior is optimal. When payouts to shareholders reduce 
the value of corporate equity by less than the amount paid, shareholders 
are better off, since creditors bear some of the costs of the payout but 
receive nothing in return. Shareholders take the sure dollars today in 
dividends and share repurchases because it is rational to do so and almost 
never face a day in the future when they first settle up with creditors and 
then walk away with the “residual.”  
Two kinds of law purport to protect corporate creditors from 
excessive dividends and share repurchases. Both are weak. First is 
corporate law, which forbids dividends and share repurchases when a 
corporation is insolvent.5 However, creditors have no direct remedy 
                                                   
Sattar A. Mansi and John K. Wald, Payout Policy with Legal Restrictions, 40 FIN. 
MGMT. 701 (2011) (examining the use of dividend payments as substitutes for 
interest payments in reducing the costs of free cash flow). 
5 Restrictions of the payment of dividends while insolvent have long 
been a part of corporate law. See, e.g., Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Transparency 
in Corporate Groups, 13 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 33, 41 (2018) (“Even 
as corporations became common and easier to create, the law imposed serious 
protections for creditors, including par value and paid-in capital requirements, 
limitations on dividends while insolvent, and the like.”); SV Inv. Partners, LLC 
v. Thoughtworks, Inc., No. CV 2724-VCL, 2010 WL 11418154, at *1 (Del. Ch. 
Nov. 10, 2010) (“An unbroken line of decisional authority dating back to the late 
nineteenth century prohibits a corporation from redeeming shares when the 
payment would render the corporation insolvent.”); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 513(a) 
(McKinney) (“Notwithstanding any authority contained in the certificate of 
incorporation, the shares of a corporation may not be purchased by the 
corporation, or, if redeemable, convertible or exchangeable shares, may not be 
redeemed, converted or exchanged, in each case for or into cash, other property, 
indebtedness or other securities of the corporation (other than shares of the 
corporation and rights to acquire such shares) if the corporation is then insolvent 
or would thereby be made insolvent.”); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 510 (a) 
(McKinney) (“A corporation may declare and pay dividends or make other 
distributions in cash or its bonds or its property, including the shares or bonds of 
other corporations, on its outstanding shares, except when currently the 
corporation is insolvent or would thereby be made insolvent, or when the 
declaration, payment or distribution would be contrary to any restrictions 
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against recipients of dividends and share repurchases, and the corporation 
itself only has a remedy against those recipients who had insufficient 
notice of their illegality. Second is voidable transfer law, which allows 
creditors to recover dividends and amounts paid for shares when the 
corporation is insolvent, unable to pay its debts as they come due, or 
inadequately capitalized. However, creditors cannot easily enforce such 
laws outside bankruptcy because the creditor typically must enforce 
voidable transfer laws on behalf of all creditors and has no clear means of 
being paid for its efforts since funds are returned to the debtor. Both sets 
of laws use insolvency or near-insolvency (inadequate capitalization) to 
trigger creditor protections. However, by the time a corporation is 
insolvent or near insolvency and the law no longer allows dividends and 
share repurchases, it is usually too late, resulting in a corporation having 
paid out sometimes massive value that might otherwise have gone to 
satisfy creditor claims.  
Our current system also calls into question some parts of the 
modern theory of corporate law. Corporate law scholarship identifies a key 
role—perhaps the only “essential” role—of corporate law as allowing for 
the partition or locking in of assets for use in a business.6 However, while 
                                                   
contained in the certificate of incorporation.”). See also Delaware statutes cited 
infra at note 20. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 The ideas are actually rather old but were rediscovered. Henry 
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 
YALE L.J. 387, 390 (2000) (“The truly essential aspect of asset partitioning is, in 
effect, the reverse of limited liability—namely, the shielding of the assets of the 
entity from claims of the creditors of the entity’s owners or managers. This means 
that organizational law is much more important as property law than as contract 
law.''); see also, Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law 
Achieved for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. Rev. 
387, 392 (2003) (stressing “the role that incorporation played in establishing a 
pool of assets that was not subject to being liquidated or dissolved by any of the 
individual participants who might want to recover their investment.”). For 
discussion that such understandings are quite old, see also Bishop Carlton Hunt, 
The Development of the Business Corporation in England, 1800-1867, 3 (1936) 
(“[I]n the seventeenth century the commercial advantages flowing from and 
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scholars are surely right to assert that creditors benefit from an inability of 
one or a few shareholders to dissolve the corporation, it is an overstatement 
to claim that “they are protected by the existence of an entity that is 
difficult to dissolve by the current owners. It is only with this protection 
that the squabbles among those who manage the company will be of 
limited interest to the creditors” because shareholders can collectively 
decide to pay out assets in the form of dividends and share repurchases.7 
This is hardly a convincing “locking in” of capital from a creditor's 
perspective.8 
The permissive allowance of dividends and share repurchases by 
corporations has severe negative social consequences.9 First, it 
dramatically increases the riskiness of corporate debt by diverting 
resources into credit monitoring and credit speculation.10 Voluntary 
creditors must charge a high price for credit ex ante to protect them from 
the ex post effects of the existing legal regime, and many resources are 
drawn into constant monitoring and trading on changing corporate 
likelihoods of default and less than full recovery on corporate debt.11 
Second, the existing legal regime requires a bankruptcy system that can 
process large and complex corporate failures when they occur.12 Third, it 
leaves firms less resilient to financial crises.13 Fourth, it unfairly shifts 
costs to involuntary and unsophisticated creditors in violation of the 
implicit social bargain of limited liability.14 Finally, it distorts the supply 
                                                   
incident to incorporation were becoming clear: perpetuity or, at least, continuity 
of existence (and management) independent of that of members; ease of suit 
against third parties or against members; transferable shares; unlimited divisibility 
of the equities; and the distinct demarcation of liability for the debts of a 
corporation, as well as of that for the debts of its shareholders.”). Hunt observed 
that “[t]he importance of non-liability for the debts of members was urged, for 
example, in the petition of the Silk Throwsters for incorporation in 1692: ‘If such 
an undertaking should be carried on only by articles of partnership, the stock will 
be liable to the particular and private debts of the several partners, and subject to 
be torn to pieces by the bankruptcy of any of them.’” Id. 
7 Edward B. Rock and Michael L. Wachter, Waiting for the Omelet to 
Set: Match-Specific Assets and Minority Oppression in Close Corporations, 24 J. 
CORP. L. 913, 920 (1999). 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. 
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of securities toward riskier debt that is publicly subsidized through the 
deductibility of interest, thereby reducing the supply of safer assets.15  
Part I of this article presents a short review of the relevant rules 
that allow and restrict dividends and share repurchases, in particular, 
contract, corporate law and voidable transfer law.  Part II presents a simple 
model of shareholder incentives to illustrate why it is so often in 
shareholders' interest to remove assets from the corporation in the form of 
dividends and share repurchases. Part III presents data on payouts of large 
U.S. public corporations from 2010 to 2018. The data shows that large 
U.S. public corporations take considerable advantage of existing rules by 
paying out a large percentage of their existing long-term debt in the form 
of dividends and share repurchases. Part IV explores the social costs of the 
law’s permissiveness of dividends and share repurchases. A short 
conclusion follows Part IV. There, the article proposes that both dividends 
and share repurchases should be allowed only for firms that meet stricter 
requirements, including safer debt, adequate insurance, and the payment 
of socially-desirable wages and benefits.   
 
I. LEGAL RULES 
A. Contract Law 
Contract lenders like banks can and do limit dividend payments 
through covenants in loan agreements.16 Creditors can also use other 
covenant violations to reduce investment and payouts to free up funds for 
debt repayment.17 In recent years, however, such restrictions have become 
less prevalent as so-called “covenant-lite” or “cov-lite” loans, which have 
fewer covenant protections for lenders and have dominated corporate 
lending.18 This competition for lending among creditors has likely reduced 
                                                   
15 Id. 
16 See Linda Allen, Aron Gottesman, Anthony Saunders, and Yi Tang, 
The Role of Banks in Dividend Policy, 41 FIN. MGMT. 591 (2012) (documenting 
how banks limit dividends while their loans are outstanding); Sudheer Chava and 
Michael R. Roberts, How Does Financing Impact Investment? The Role of Debt 
Covenants, 63 J. FIN. 2085 (2008) (showing that investment declines after a debt 
covenant violation). 
17 See Greg Nini, David C. Smith, and Amir Sufi, Creditor Control 
Rights, Corporate Governance, and Firm Value, 25 REV. FIN. STUD. 1713 (2012) 
(demonstrating that creditors actively enforce covenant violations to prohibit 
payouts to shareholders). 
18 See Mayra Rodriguez Valladares, Rating Agencies Sound Alarm About 
Leveraged Loans And CLOs, FORBES (Dec. 18, 2018) 
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the positive externality that previous—and more demanding lenders—
generated for less sophisticated voluntary creditors and involuntary 
creditors alike. 
 
B. Corporate Law 
State corporate law also limits dividend payments and share 
repurchases. Under most corporate law, including that in Delaware,19 the 
corporation's directors can declare and pay dividends and make share 
repurchases so long as the corporation is insolvent and certain other minor 
requirements are met.20 Interestingly, a valid dividend declaration creates 
a debtor-creditor relationship with the shareholders entitled to the 
dividend, who then may sue the corporation as creditors for later failing to 
pay.21 The directors are personally liable for wrongfully-declared 
dividends,22 and that liability extends to creditors “in the event of [the 
corporation's] dissolution or insolvency[.]”23 But that remedy is 
inadequate when the amount of the dividends and repurchases far exceeds 
                                                   
https://www.forbes.com/sites/mayrarodriguezvalladares/2018/12/18/rating-
agencies-sound-alarm-about-leveraged-loans-and-clos/#46e2b6894d6d. 
19 Delaware is the state if incorporation of about 60% of the stock-market 
capitalization of U.S. public companies as of December 31, 2018. Data from 
Bloomberg LLP. 
20 Under Delaware law, the corporation's directors can declare and pay 
dividends out of its surplus (the amount by which net assets exceed liabilities and 
the corporation's stated capital), or, if there is no such surplus, “out of its net 
profits for the fiscal year in which the dividend is declared and/or the preceding 
fiscal year.” 8 Del. C. §§ 154, 170. This is true only if the capital has not been 
impaired, that is, fallen below the amount of the preference of any stock with 
preference rights. Id. The directors of a Delaware corporation may cause the 
corporation to purchase the corporation's own shares, again, so long as the 
corporation's capital is not impaired. 8 Del. C. § 160. 
21 See Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Panhandle E. Corp., 545 A.2d 1171, 
1175 (Del. 1988) (“The general rule regarding the vesting of cash dividends is 
that a contractual right of the stockholder to the dividend becomes fixed upon the 
declaration of the dividend. Thus, upon a valid declaration of a dividend the 
corporation becomes indebted to the stockholder, and the stockholder may recover 
the declared amount in an action, ex contractu, against the corporation.”) 
22 8 Del. C. § 174(a) (“In case of any willful or negligent violation of § 
160 or § 173 of this title, the directors under whose administration the same may 
happen shall be jointly and severally liable, at any time within [six] years after 
paying such unlawful dividend or after such unlawful stock purchase . . . .”). 
23 Id. 
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the wealth of the directors as is often the case for large public companies. 
Delaware law allows recourse by the corporation (not creditors directly) 
only against shareholders  “who received the dividend on, or assets for the 
sale or redemption of, their stock with knowledge of facts indicating that 
such dividend, stock purchase or redemption was unlawful.”24 Corporate 
law thus provides little to no protection to creditors for the payment of 
illegal dividends or the making of illegal share repurchases. 
  
C. Voidable Transfer Law 
Voidable transfer law provides stronger protections, prohibiting 
the payment of dividends and the making of share repurchases by an 
insolvent—or nearly-insolvent—corporation and providing for direct 
enforcement by creditors against transfer recipients. State and federal 
voidable transfer laws (also known as fraudulent transfer or fraudulent 
conveyance laws) prohibit transfers that are made without the corporation 
receiving “a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or 
obligation” if the corporation was “insolvent at that time or . . . became 
insolvent as a result of the transfer.”25 The same laws prohibit transfers 
that leave the corporation with “assets [that are] unreasonably small in 
relation to the business.''26 The idea of unreasonably small assets has been 
interpreted as a condition just short of insolvency.27 
Insolvent firms cannot pay dividends or make share repurchases 
under voidable transfer laws because the corporation receives no value in 
return for the payment.28 But as with corporate law, the enforcement 
mechanisms are weak. A creditor may sue to avoid the transfer, requiring 
                                                   
24 8 Del. C. § 174(c); see, e.g., PHP Liquidating, LLC v. Robbins, 291 
B.R. 603, 608–09 (D. Del. 2003), aff’d sub nom. In re PHP Healthcase Corp., 128 
F. App’x 839 (3d Cir. 2005) (“In the instant case, Defendants sold their stock 
through stockbrokers and there are no allegations that Defendants were aware that 
PHP Corporation’s capital was impaired. Thus, the Court concludes that 
Defendants redeemed their stock in good faith. Accordingly, the Court concludes 
that Section 174 of the DGCL does not provide PHP LLC with a remedy for 
violations of Section 160.”) 
25 6 Del. C. § 1305 (Delaware’s adoption of the Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfer Act); see also Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.05 (California’s adoption of the 
newer Uniform Voidable Transfer Act), 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 548(a)(1)(B)(i), 
548(a)(1)(ii)(I) (federal version of fraudulent transfer law). 
26 6 Del. C. § 1304; Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.04; 11 U.S.C.A. § 
548(a)(1)(B)(i) and (ii)(II). 
27 For discussion of this and other solvency tests, see J.B. Heaton, 
Solvency Tests, 62 BUS. LAW. 983 (2007). 
28 Feinberg v. RM Acquisition, LLC, 629 F.3d 671, 674 (7th Cir. 2011) 
(“[A] dividend is not an exchange for reasonably equivalent value.”). 
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the return to the corporation of the money paid for the dividends or share 
repurchase,29 but has no right to the transferred assets or their proceeds 
unless the creditor's claim has been reduced to judgment.30 While any 
individual creditor could bring an action to set aside the transfer, the statute 
has no mechanism for recovery of that creditor’s litigation costs. Thus, that 
creditor bears all the costs of the litigation- likely to be fact-intensive and 
expensive because of the need to test for insolvency - and must share the 
benefits of the recovery with all creditors. Unsurprisingly, there is very 
little litigation under state fraudulent transfer law outside bankruptcy. 
 
II. SHAREHOLDER INCENTIVES: A SIMPLE MODEL 
The law provides only weak protections to creditors against 
dividends and share repurchases by even insolvent firms, but that would 
be of little concern if shareholders had no strong interest in receiving 
dividends or selling their shares to the repurchasing corporation. A simple 
analysis of shareholder incentives, however, shows just how strong those 
incentives can be.  
More than forty years ago, Fischer Black and Myron Scholes31 and 
separately, Robert Merton32 pointed out that the equity of an indebted 
corporation is analytically equivalent to a call option on the firm's 
underlying assets with the amount of the debt repayment obligation at the 
debt's maturity as the strike price on the option. We can use this insight to 
understand the incentives that shareholders have to receive dividends and 
share repurchases. We start with the familiar Black-Scholes call option 
pricing formula defined in terms applicable to analysis of firm equity, 
assets and debt:  
 𝐸(𝐴$, 𝑡) = 𝑁(𝑑+)𝐴$ − 𝑁(𝑑-)𝐵𝑒01(20$) 
                                                   
29 6 Del. C. § 1307(a) (“In an action for relief against a transfer or 
obligation under this chapter, a creditor, subject to the limitations in § 1308 of this 
title, may obtain: (1) Avoidance of the transfer or obligation to the extent 
necessary to satisfy the creditor's claim . . . .”).  
30 6 Del. C. § 1307(b) (“If a creditor has obtained a judgment on a claim 
against the debtor, the creditor, if the court so orders, may levy execution on the 
asset transferred or its proceeds.”) 
31 Fischer Black and Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and 
Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637 (1973). 
32 Robert C. Merton, On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk 
Structure of Interest Rates, 29 J. FIN. 449 (1974). 
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where 𝑑+ = +3√20$ [ln 6789 : + 6𝑟 + 3=- : (𝑇 − 𝑡)] and 𝑑- = 𝑑+ −𝜎√𝑇 − 𝑡. 
 
In this representation, 𝐸(𝐴$, 𝑡) denotes the market value of the 
firm's equity at time 𝑡, 𝐴$  denotes the market value of the firm's assets at 
time 𝑡, and 𝐵 denotes the face value of the firm’s (assumed zero-coupon) 
debt that matures at time 𝑇. As in the standard representation, 𝑟 is the 
annual risk-free rate with continuous compounding, 𝜎 is the volatility of 
returns of the firm's assets, and 𝑁(. ) is the cumulative distribution function 
of the standard normal distribution.  
We can assume without loss of much generality that the risk-free 
rate 𝑟 = 0, which allows us to simplify the formula for the insights we 
most care about here. The market value of the equity is then:  
 𝐸(𝐴$, 𝑡) = 𝑁(𝑑+)𝐴$ − 𝑁(𝑑-)𝐵 
where 𝑑+ = +3√20$ [ln 6789 : + 63=- : (𝑇 − 𝑡)] and 𝑑- = 𝑑+ −𝜎√𝑇 − 𝑡. 
 
Delaware corporate law requires directors to manage the 
corporation to maximize the long-run interests of shareholders.33 If we 
assume that the directors can pay out assets while the assets remaining 
with the firm continue evolving in the same way after the payout, this 
implies that the directors should pay out assets (as dividends or share 
repurchases) in amount 𝑃 from the current asset value 𝐴$  so long as 
 𝐸(𝐴$, 𝑡) + 	𝑃$ ≥ 	𝐸(𝐴$, 𝑡) 
where 𝐸(𝐴$, 𝑡 − 𝑃$, 𝑡) = 𝑁F𝑑+,GH𝐴$, 𝑡 − 𝑃$ − 𝑁F𝑑-,GH𝐵 
 
with 𝑑+,G = +3√20$ [ln 6780G89 : + 63=- : (𝑇 − 𝑡)] and 𝑑-,G = 𝑑+,G −𝜎√𝑇 − 𝑡. 
 
That is, the directors maximize the long-run interests of 
shareholders by paying out assets, so long as the assets from the payout 
plus the remaining equity value is greater than the equity value without 
                                                   
33 See TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., No. CIV.A. 10298, 
1989 WL 20290, at *7 (Del. Ch.  1989) (“Thus, broadly, directors may be said to 
owe a duty to shareholders as a class to manage the corporation within the law, 
with due care and in a way intended to maximize the long run interests of 
shareholders.”). 
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payout of dividends or share repurchases. Clearly, so long as the value of 
the equity declines by less than $1 for every $1 paid out, the directors 
should continue paying out, or, put in terms of option “greeks,” the firm 
should continue to payout so long as the option's “delta” (the change in the 
value of the equity for a change in the value of the assets) is less than or 
equal to one as it must be, because every dollar removed from the assets 
puts a dollar in the shareholders' pockets but reduces the value of their 
remaining equity by less than one dollar. This is true because the 
shareholders are able to benefit fully from every dollar paid out but bear 
only part of the decline in the value of the assets. The rest of the decline is 
borne by the creditors who receive no part of the payout.  
If, however, the directors must also satisfy a balance-sheet 
solvency requirement,34  
 𝐴$ − 𝑃$ ≥ 𝐵 
 
that is, that the assets remaining after the payout are worth more 
than the face value of the debt, or, if the adequate-capital test requires an 
additional cushion of amount c, then  
 𝐴$ − 𝑃$ ≥ 𝐵 + 𝑐 
that is, that the assets remaining after the payout are worth more 
than the debt plus a small “cushion,” then the directors will pay out assets 𝑃 until the solvency constraint binds. 
We can see the expropriation of creditors that occurs if we let 𝐷 
be the market value of the debt (with face value 𝐵) before any payout and 𝐷G be the market value of the debt after payout 𝑃. Then it is clear that:  
 𝐷 − 𝐷G > 0 
 
since, what the equity gains from the payout - the amount of the 
payout 𝑃 less the difference in the post-payout stock value - is what the 
debt loses: 
 𝐷 −𝐷G = 𝑃$ + [𝑁(𝑑+)𝐴$ − 𝑁(𝑑-)𝐵] − [	𝑁F𝑑+,GH𝐴$, 𝑡 − 𝑃$− 𝑁F𝑑-,GH𝐵] 
                                                   
34 The United States Bankruptcy Code and state voidable transfer laws 
define “insolvent” using a balance-sheet solvency test as the “financial condition 
such that the sum of such entity’s debts is greater than all such entity's property, 
at a fair valuation[.]'' 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(32)(A). 
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which is greater than zero.  
 
Of course, directors cannot scale down the operations of the firm 
in a perfectly divisible way. Assets are generally lumpy, so payouts for 
many corporations will be much lower, which would drive the corporation 
close to insolvency.  Note, however, that this is a constraint placed on the 
directors by characteristics of the assets of the firm and their divisibility. 
We would expect that where corporations segregate assets easily—such as 
through a sale or spinoff of a division that is not necessary for the 
remaining business or where the corporation's assets include a large 
amount of cash, whether from operations or financing—then the 
shareholders will have an incentive to seek the payout of assets from the 
directors.  
 
III. DIVIDENDS AND SHARE REPURCHASES: SOME DATA 
How extensive are dividends and share repurchases among U.S. 
public corporations? To explore this question, I take all Russell 3000 firms 
as of December 31, 2018 that have been in the Russell 3000 since 
December 31, 2009, inclusive. The Russell 3000 is a stock-market-
capitalization-weighted index that FTSE Russell maintains to benchmark 
the universe of U.S. public stocks, though it omits some very small-cap 
stocks. This results in 1,560 listed companies and 14,040 firm years. I then 
eliminate firm years where the prior year-end long-term debt is zero. This 
eliminates 2,029 firm years and leaves 12,011 firm years. For each firm, I 
collect year-end stock-market capitalization, year-end long-term debt, 
dividends paid, and net share repurchases (repurchases net of issuances). 
All data is from Bloomberg.  
We are interested in the payout in dividends and share repurchases 
in a given year, say 2012, relative to the prior year end's (say December 
31, 2011) stock-market capitalization, and long-term debt. We use the 
prior-year long-term debt because that debt is, by definition, not due in the 
following year so we can be confident that most of it (barring refinancing 
or repayment ahead of schedule) was outstanding in the year of the payouts 
we measure. Long-term debt is only a lower bound on the outstanding 
obligations of the corporation since it will not reflect unquantified, 
contingent obligations and other non-debt liabilities that are not offset by 
assets. 
Table I presents data for all firms from 2010 to 2018 (we lose the 
2009 firms since we need one year of past year-end values for every year 
analyzed in the table). The median U.S. public firm in the Russell 3000 
population is large, about the size of the smaller firms in the S&P500 in 
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the relevant years. Median long-term debt is also substantial, exceeding 
$450 million in all years and rising to just over $900 million by year end 
2017. Median payout (dividends plus net share repurchases) rises 
substantially over the period. While stock-market capitalization roughly 
doubles as does long-term debt, net payout rises over five times.  
 
 
 
Table II shows that the median payout as a percentage of 
outstanding long-term debt also rises substantially during the period, more 
than doubling from 3.7% in 2010 to 9.3% in 2018. The long-term debt-to-
equity ratio, a measure of how financially leveraged the firm is, decreased 
by 2018, but not smoothly. The median long-term-debt-to-equity ratio is 
2018 is 21.9%. The correlation between payout percentage and the long-
term-debt-to-equity ratio is near zero but reliably negative. The correlation 
is driven largely by the fact that some firms have very little debt, so their 
payouts are very large percentages of their long-term debt. 
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Together, Tables I and II demonstrate that shareholders routinely 
get paid out before creditors are paid. Large indebted U.S. public 
corporations take considerable advantage of the ability to indebted 
corporations to distribute cash to shareholders through dividends and share 
repurchases.  
 
IV. SOCIAL COSTS 
A. Benefits 
Before discussing the social costs of dividends and repurchases, it 
is important to acknowledge their potential benefit. That benefit comes 
from forcing the corporation to disgorge free cash flow that managers 
might otherwise waste.35 This is especially true because of considerable 
evidence that corporate managers are too optimistic about their firms,36 
and optimistic managers are likely to waste free cash flow.37 But, while 
                                                   
35 Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate 
Finance, and Takeovers, 76 AMER. ECON. REV. 323, 323 (1986) (the most widely-
cited and influential work arguing that managers will waste free cash flow because 
of agency problems). 
36 See Ulrike Malmendier and Geoffrey Tate, Behavioral CEOs: On the 
Role of Managerial Overconfidence, 29 J. ECON PERSP. 37, 57 (2015) (“A large 
and growing body of evidence suggests that a substantial share of top corporate 
executives exhibit symptoms of overconfidence in their decisions.”) 
37 See Dirk Hackbarth, Managerial Traits and Capital Structure 
Decisions, 43 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 843 (2008) (studying the impact 
of managerial optimism on capital structure choices); J.B. Heaton, Managerial 
Optimism and Corporate Finance, 31 FIN. MGMT. 33 (2002) (showing that 
managerial optimism predicts pecking-order capital structure preferences and 
problems with free cash flow); Winifred Huang-Meier, Neophytos Lambertides 
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dividends and share repurchases do take cash flow away from optimistic 
managers, evidence suggests that managers get around this problem by 
avoiding the greater commitment of dividends in preference for more 
adjustable share repurchases,38 and that more optimistic managers avoid 
longer-maturity debt that ties up cash flow for longer periods of time in 
favor of short-term debt.39 Thus, whatever benefits might exist in reducing 
cash flow in the hands of optimistic managers, it seems likely that 
managers are already able to loosen those constraints when they like. In 
any event, long-term debt is a more effective way of reducing free cash 
flow than dividends or share repurchases, because with debt the 
commitment is enforceable through contract.40 
 
B. Costs: Riskier Debt 
Our permissive allowance of dividends and share repurchases by 
corporations increases the riskiness, and therefore the cost of corporate 
debt, in turn diverting resources into credit monitoring and credit 
speculation. Firms can pay out assets right up to the vicinity of insolvency 
(the point where the firm would be considered inadequately capitalized 
under voidable transfer law) and, because the enforcement mechanisms 
for creditors in corporate law and voidable transfer law are so weak, they 
can actually pay dividends and make share repurchases past that point with 
                                                   
and James M. Steeley, Motives for Corporate Cash Holdings: The CEO Optimism 
Effect, 47 REV. QUANTITATIVE FIN. & ACCT. 699 (2016) (finding, consistent with 
predictions of managerial optimism, that optimistic managers are reluctant to use 
external funds and hoard cash for growth opportunities, use more cash for capital 
expenditure and acquisitions, and save more cash in bad times). 
38 See Sanjay Deshmukh, Anand M. Goel & Keith M. Howe, CEO 
Overconfidence and Dividend Policy, 22 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 440 (2013) 
(finding that the level of dividend payout is about one-sixth lower in firms 
managed by CEOs who are more likely to be optimistic, consistent with the 
preference of such managers for internal financing); Pei-Gi Shu, Yin-Hua Yeh, 
Tsui-Lin Chiang and Jui-Yi Hung, Managerial Overconfidence and Share 
Repurchases, 13 INT’L REV. FIN. 39 (2013) (finding that managerial 
overconfidence is positively correlated with the intensity of share repurchasing, 
which is measured by scale, execution, frequency, and the difference between the 
announced price and post-execution price). 
39 See Ronghong Huang, Kelvin Jui Keng Tan, and Robert W.Faff, CEO 
Overconfidence and Corporate Debt Maturity,  36 J. CORP. FIN. 93 (2016) 
(finding that firms with overconfident CEOs tend to adopt a shorter debt maturity 
structure by using a higher proportion of short-term debt). 
40 See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text. 
2019  SOCIAL COSTS OF DIVIDENDS & SHARE REPURCHASES 377 
little worry about the consequences if they expect the firm to remain out 
of bankruptcy. This situation not only requires creditors to charge a higher 
price for credit ex ante— especially where they substitute a higher price 
for covenant protections—but also generates significant speculative 
demand for risky debt and credit derivatives,41 and thus, for credit 
monitoring that would be unnecessary if the debt were owed by 
corporations that faced much higher hurdles to the making of gratuitous 
asset transfers to shareholders.  
 
C. Costs: A Large Bankruptcy System 
Our permissive allowance of dividends and share repurchases by 
corporations also creates the need for a much larger bankruptcy system 
capable of dealing with large and complex capital structures with defaulted 
debt and unpaid tort claimants.42 For example, PG&E Corporation filed 
for bankruptcy protection on January 29, 2019 because of potential 
liabilities it faced in connection with California wildfires.43 At the time of 
the filing, PG&E had nearly $20 billion of debt outstanding,44 and had paid 
out $7.25 billion in dividends from 2009 through 2018. When General 
Motors Corporation filed for bankruptcy protection in 2009, it did so after 
a payout of more than $15 billion to shareholders from 1998 through 
2008.45  
The cost of a system for large corporate bankruptcies goes far 
beyond the costs of the court system, of course, to include the enormous 
professional fees paid to lawyers, accountants, and financial advisors.46 
 
                                                   
41 See Christopher L. Culp, Andria van der Merwe, and Bettina J. Stärkle, 
Credit Default Swaps: Mechanics and Empirical Evidence on Benefits, Costs, and 
Inter-Market Relations (2018). 
42 See KENNETH AYOTTE, DISAGREEMENT AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
COMPLEXITY (2018), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3276779 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3276779 (discussing fact that “many corporate 
bankruptcies involve complicated, fragmented capital structures characterized by 
many layers of debt.”) 
43 Pac. Gas & Elec. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (2019). 
44 Id. 
45 Gen. Motors Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (2009). 
46 Stephen J. Lubben, The Chapter 11 Financial Advisors, 28 EMORY 
BANKR. DEV. J. 11, 20 (2011) (discussing the cost of professionals associated with 
corporate bankruptcy proceedings). 
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D. Costs: More Fragile Firms 
Our current system also makes firms more fragile and less resilient 
to financial crises. Defaults on corporate debt increase in economic 
recessions.47 Because firms pay out so much asset value to shareholders 
when times are good, they may need expensive bailouts when times turn.48 
Aside from being more susceptible to economy-wide crises, firms 
that pay out cash may miss valuable investment opportunities. The extent 
to which corporations suffer from financing constraints that prevent 
valuable investment is controversial, and we must acknowledge the 
possibility of waste, but the evidence is close enough to think that there 
are times corporations have positive net present value investments they 
cannot take—with all the attendant costs to shareholders and other 
stakeholders like employees, would-be employees, and communities that 
would benefit from the investments.49 Evidence shows that firms that are 
financially constrained benefit from large cash holdings.50 
                                                   
47 See, e.g., Dirk Hackbarth, Jianjun Miao, and Erwan Morellec, Capital 
Structure, Credit Risk and Macroeconomic Conditions, 82 J. FIN. ECON. 519 
(2006) (finding that yields on risky debt are, in part, compensation for 
macroeconomic risks of recession). 
48 On the disruptions and responses required by the most recent credit 
crisis, see, e.g., Charles W. Calomiris and Urooj Khan, An Assessment of TARP 
Assistance to Financial Institutions, 29 J. ECON. PERSP. 53 (2015) (analyzing the 
effects of the Troubled Asset Relief Program, including implications for justice 
and fairness); W. Scott Frame, Andreas Fuster, Joseph Tracy and James Vickery, 
The Rescue of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 29 J. ECON. PERSP. 25 (2015) 
(analyzing the steps needed to rescue Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac during the 
financial crisis of 2007-2009); Robert McDonald and Anna Paulson, AIG in 
Hindsight, 29 J. ECON. PERSP. 81 (2015) (analyzing the controversial decision to 
rescue American International Group from insolvency); David Zaring, Litigating 
the Financial Crisis, 100 VA. L. REV. 1405 (2014) (analyzing various litigations 
arising from the 2007-2009 financial crisis). 
49 See, e.g., John L. Campbell, Dan S. Dhaliwal & William C. Schwartz, 
Jr., Financing Constraints and the Cost of Capital: Evidence from the Funding of 
Corporate Pension Plans, 25 REV. FIN. STUDIES 868 (2012) (finding evidence that 
financial market frictions impact corporate investment). 
50 David J. Denis and Valeriy Sibilkov, Financial Constraints, 
Investment, and the Value of Cash Holdings, 23 REV. FIN. STUDIES 247 (2010) 
(demonstrating that larger cash holdings increase firm value for companies that 
face external financing constraints). But see Leigh A. Riddick & Toni M. Whited, 
The Corporate Propensity to Save, 64 J. FIN. 1729 (2009) (arguing that saving 
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E. Costs: Harm to Unsophisticated and Involuntary Creditors 
Our permissive allowance of dividends and share repurchases by 
corporations also unfairly shifts costs to involuntary and unsophisticated 
creditors, in violation of the implicit social bargain of limited liability. 
Again, PG&E Corporation provides a good example. The company filed 
for bankruptcy on January 29, 2019, after disclosing it would do so 
because of potential liability for a wildfire that began near Paradise, 
California, on November 8, 2018.51 The fire consumed 153,336 acres, led 
to 86 fatalities and destroyed 13,972 residences, 528 commercial 
structures and 4,293 other buildings.52 It is alleged that the utility’s 
equipment caused the fire as there is considerable evidence that the utility's 
equipment caused the fire.53 If the corporation is unable to pay in full for 
the damages the fire caused, it will exit bankruptcy having paid billions of 
dollars in dividends in prior years that were not available to pay such 
claims.  
 
F. Costs: Distortions to the Supply of Securities 
Our permissive allowance of dividends and share repurchases by 
corporations also distorts the supply of securities available for investors. 
There is likely an oversupply of risky debt and equity—high debt making 
both debt and equity riskier—and an undersupply of safe debt equity. 
Economists have argued recently that the supply of safe assets has not kept 
up with demand, which the economists attribute to high demand from 
emerging economies that cannot keep up with supply from slower-
growing advanced economies,54 but which is also due to the fact that 
corporate debt is much riskier than it would be under less permissive rules 
on dividends and share repurchases. The distortion is arguably worse 
                                                   
propensities are dependent on too many factors to be tied reliably to external 
financing constraints). 
51 Pac. Gas & Elec. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) (2019). 
52 Id. at 2. 
53 Id. 
54 See Ricardo J. Caballero, Emmanuel Farhi, and Pierre-Olivier 
Gourinchas, The Safe Assets Shortage Conundrum, 31 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 30 
(2017) (arguing that “[f]or the last few decades, with minor cyclical interruptions, 
the supply of safe assets has not kept up with global demand. The reason is 
straightforward: the collective growth rate of the advanced economies that 
produce safe assets has been lower than the world's growth rate, which has been 
driven disproportionately by the high growth rate of high-saving emerging 
economies such as China.”). 
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because it is subsidized by the public through the tax deductibility of 
interest expense,55 riskier debt typically requiring at higher interest rates 
and thus more subsidy. 
 
CONCLUSION 
As a means of making money, the corporation is unrivaled. It has 
proven itself as the superior way of organizing business on a large scale 
that involves the issuance of securities designed to attract stockholders. 
The most important and successful aspect of a corporation’s financing is 
that corporations are legally separate and distinct from other entities, 
including their shareholders. It is legal separateness that makes limited 
liability enforceable against all other legal persons, since the corporation 
contracts and injures in its own name. Legal scholars have long claimed 
that shareholders, as the residual claimants of this entity, have the right 
incentives to monitor so that assets are left over for them when all the debts 
are paid. But this view is naive. It ignores the fact that directors, elected 
by shareholders, use dividends and share repurchases to turn shareholders 
into first-in, first-out, and then some capital providers.  
Our permissive allowance of dividends and share repurchases 
helps explain how such a successful financing mechanism as the corporate 
form can leave so many dissatisfied. Shareholders have a strong incentive 
to pull assets out of the corporation because doing so shifts risks to other 
stakeholders while giving shareholders all the benefits. One need not agree 
with all parts of the criticism of share repurchases to see that there is 
something quite compelling in the general argument.56 The corporation as 
legal form, including the background rules governing dividends and share 
repurchases, is designed to attract shareholders and will, sometimes at 
least, poorly serve those who are not shareholders. Shareholders might 
                                                   
55 See generally, for example, Ruud A. De Mooij, Tax Biases to Debt 
Finance: Assessing the Problem, Finding Solutions, 33 FISCAL STUD. 489 (2012) 
(demonstrating that there are no good economic rationales for the tax deductibility 
of interest). 
56 Cf. Chuck Schumer & Bernie Sanders, Schumer and Sanders: Limit 
Corporate Stock Buybacks, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/03/opinion/chuck-schumer-bernie-
sanders.html (arguing that “when corporations direct resources to buy back shares 
on this scale, they restrain their capacity to reinvest profits more meaningfully in 
the company in terms of R&D, equipment, higher wages, paid medical leave, 
retirement benefits and worker retraining.”) 
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face less organized resistance from creditors, employees, and government 
officials, if they became truly residual claimants.  
One possibility that deserves further study is restricting dividends 
and share repurchases to corporations that have low debt and adequately 
insured against harm to involuntary creditors, and that meet higher 
thresholds for wages and benefits. Such a rule would still allow 
corporations to operate without doing those things—they could still have 
high debt, be underinsured, and pay minimum wages with minimal 
benefits. But, if they did so, they could not pay shareholders until they first 
met all their other obligations.  The question is whether shareholders 
would be willing to invest in corporations—especially indebted 
corporations—that do not provide large payouts in the form of dividends 
and share repurchases. That question remains for further study, but since 
nearly all corporate wealth reflect secondary trading of shares and not 
capital formation for new business, a push for rules in the proposed 
direction would likely address the considerable social harm that our 
current permissive regime is causing. 
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